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Abstract 
The current study was to test whether Reality Monitoring and language use could distinguish 
identity liars from truth tellers when answering outcome questions and unexpected process 
questions. Truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 30) discussed their identity in a recruitment 
interview. No differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in the details they provided. 
In terms of language use, liars used more positive language than truth tellers, whilst truth 
tellers used more cognitive process words than liars. However, neither were more 
pronounced when asking process questions. Overall, process questions elicited more 
cognitive process and cause words than outcome questions. Therefore, process questions may 
be able to contribute to the cognitive load approach. The findings suggest that Reality 
Monitoring may not be diagnostic when applied to identity deception. We discuss the 
language use differences in relation to Impression Management theory.  
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Are You for Real?  
Exploring Language Use and Unexpected Process Questions Within the Detection of 
Identity Deception 
False identities have been acknowledged as a significant contributor to the 
catastrophic terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Lowe, 2006; Salter, 2004). Yet the enhanced quality of 
falsified documents and passports has meant that their identification is becoming 
progressively challenging (Zill, 2002) and, as such, it presents as a national security risk 
(Sirotich, 2007; Barber, 2015). It is thus deemed necessary to implement further protocol to 
be able to identify individuals using a false identity. 
Whilst telling lies is often thought to be relatively easy, the detection of these lies is 
difficult (DePaulo, 2018). On average, lie detection accuracy rarely exceeds that of chance 
level, even amongst perceived experts within the field (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & 
O’Sullivan, 1991; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Vrij, 2008). Whilst deception research initially 
concentrated on non-verbal behaviours, evidence has suggested that of the very few cues 
associated deception, these are usually only weakly correlated and unreliable (DePaulo et al, 
2003). Our current understanding from research is that by using theory-based interview 
techniques, an increase can be seen in the discrimination ability of investigators to identify 
differences between the verbal accounts of truth tellers and liars (Vrij, 2008; Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). For example, the verbal output of liars is often shorter than that of truth tellers (Kraut, 
1978; Sporer & Sharman, 2006) and truth tellers often include more detail than liars (Vrij, 
2008; 2015). This can be explained by the complexities involved in telling a lie. The 
cognitive lie detection approach (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017) theorises that lying is more 
difficult than truth telling (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). In addition, by 
strategically making the task of lying more difficult, verbal cues to deceit can be magnified 
(Vrij et al., 2017). There are three main methods which contribute to the cognitive load 
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approach: (i) imposing cognitive load, (ii) asking the interviewee to say more and (iii) 
unexpected questions (Vrij et al., 2017). In the current study, we utilised the unexpected 
questions element of the cognitive lie detection approach (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 
2013; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008).  
Lying about Identity 
Whilst deception detection is heavily dominated by ‘police-suspect’ interviews 
whereby individuals lie or tell the truth about a transgression (Vrij & Granhag, 2014), 
DePaulo and Bond (2012) have highlighted that many individuals lie about their identity. The 
study of identity deception is highly underrepresented within the deception literature and with 
increasing numbers of false documents leading to a passport fraud ‘epidemic’ (Paravicini, 
2016), the mere examination of identity documents is not a strong enough security measure 
when dealing with identity fraud. Interpol (2018) reported that from January to September in 
2016, their Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database (SLTD) was searched 1.2bn times, 
resulting in identification of 115,000 positive responses or ‘hits’. Whilst this number 
represents when a document has been questioned in terms of its authenticity, the number of 
falsified documents which are not questioned (due to the quality of falsified documents), and 
in circulation, is difficult to quantify.  
Research highlights online tools to identify online identity theft and fraud (e.g., Tan, 
Guo, Cahalane, & Cheng, 2016; Thakur, 2017), but the study of the identity deceiver’s verbal 
characteristics in face to face scenarios is negligible. What may contribute to the lack of 
research within identity deception is that identity is complex and can be viewed as both 
domain-specific and global (Goosens, 2001). Domain-specific identity relates to the unique 
components of our identity, such as education, occupation, demographics, experiences and 
autobiographical memory. Global identity is an ideological identity; the way we are viewed 
as a singular entity, as a combination of each of the elements of our domain-specific identity. 
UNEXPECTED PROCESS QUESTIONS IN IDENTITY DECEPTION 5 
In terms of domain-specific identity deception, scholars have investigated the lies people tell 
about their autobiographical memories (Elntib, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2015; Sartori, 
Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), occupation (Jupe, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2016; 
Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012), experiences (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; 
Sporer & Sharman, 2006), opinions (Leal, Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2010) and intentions (Ask, 
Granhag, Juhlin, & Vrij, 2013; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, 
Jundi, & Granhag, 2012). However, we are not aware of any published research that looks at 
individuals who lie about their global identity. In the current study, we aimed to combine 
questions from different domain-specific areas and autobiographical memories into one 
single interview, with the aim of gaining insight into how individuals who have to lie about 
many different elements of their identity (forming their global identity) differ from identity 
truth tellers. What is novel in the current study is that instead of merely looking at the way 
individuals respond to questions related to their passport, we aim to ask question which are 
both unrelated and unexpected as a way of eliciting differences in their verbal responses. This 
is in addition to allowing participants a week to prepare after being given a false identity 
(liars only).   
In comparison with a transgression related police-suspect style interview, an 
individual who lies about his/her global identity no longer has to fabricate an account of what 
s/he did, but, instead, has to fabricate a story about whom s/he is (Jupe et al., 2016). This 
includes combining a variety of domain-specific elements into one global set of responses, 
including episodic memories. Lying individuals, however, have to not only manage their 
responses to deceptive episodic memories, but also align these responses to those which are 
more identity related. We imagine that this process will be more cognitively demanding than 
when individuals are only asked to lie about domain-specific elements. In addition, all 
individuals have an identity which they can relate to and which they have built over time. In 
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contrast, not all individuals have committed a crime. Therefore, the notion of lying about 
identity relates to lying about something we have all experienced, rather than something we 
have not. It is how an individual can manipulate this overriding experience into that of an 
alternative identity in terms of language use and detail, which is of interest in the current 
study.  
The ways in which individuals deceive in terms of their identity within law 
enforcement was addressed by Wang, Chen and Atabakhsh (2004), who examined criminal 
records database information. They found that to avoid initial prosecution, individuals would 
manipulate their identity via various strategies such as their name spelling variation, using 
similar pronunciations, name abbreviations, middle name swapping, and amending their 
residency, date-of-birth and social security number. Although the study highlighted tactics 
used by individuals to ‘beat the system’ in terms of database entries, it did not provide insight 
into verbal differences between identity truth tellers and deceivers during an interview. It also 
does not reflect how individuals who perhaps enter through borders on false security 
documents would be identified. If an individual were to enter the country on a falsified 
document, including only subtle changes to their passport information, the individual is 
unlikely to flagged by a computerised system. This is even less likely when actual documents 
are used especially as there is no EU/worldwide system for document inspection (Ensor, 
2017). The current research therefore aims to look beyond the digital information relating to 
an individual’s identity and examines the level of detail provided in verbal accounts of 
individuals who are asked to lie or tell the truth about who they are.  
Asking the Unexpected 
The unanticipated question approach introduced by Vrij et al. (2009) is derived from 
the notion that liars typically prepare themselves for interviews by formulating answers to 
anticipated questions (Granhag, Stromwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 
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2010). This is an effective strategy as prepared lies are harder to detect than spontaneous lies 
because they contain fewer cues to deceit (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, Taylor, & Picornell, 
2015). We provide a short synopsis of the current unanticipated approach to lie detection. 
Asking unexpected questions was tested as a way of eliciting non-verbal leakage and 
revealing information by Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu and Rockwell (1994). Burgoon and 
colleagues demonstrated that novices (those assumed to have no prior interviewing 
experience) had greater level of deception detection accuracy when using unexpected 
questions than when using repeated or rehearsed questions. Expected questions (those which 
may have been planned for) are likely to reduce a liar’s cognitive load, whilst unexpected 
questions are likely to increase a liar’s cognitive load (Vrij, 2015). It is expected, therefore, 
that verbal outputs to unexpected questions are likely to differ between liars and truth tellers. 
Liars will not have prepared answers to questions which are unexpected. Therefore, when 
answering unexpected questions, differences between truth tellers and liars may emerge, such 
as truth tellers reporting more details than liars (Lancaster et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 2013; 
Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, & Granhag, 2013) and more indicators of planning type behaviours 
(Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Liu-Jönsson, 2013; Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps, & Vrij, 2013; Vrij, 
Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011). 
Unexpected approaches can also include the ‘devil’s advocate’ approach, in which 
interviewees are asked to generate opinions in opposition of their own (Deeb et al., 2018; 
Leal, Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2010). Generating answers in line with one’s own views is 
deemed less cognitively demanding than having to generate views which do not align 
themselves with one’s own ideological views and values. Individuals asked to verbalise 
opinions which do not align with their own views will need to use a dual monitoring 
approach; that is being aware of one’s own opinions whilst verbalising opinions which are in 
contrast. Unexpected questions also include the use of drawings during an interview 
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(Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012). After 
responding to an unexpected question, the same question is then repeated but the participant 
is asked to respond using a different modality; that of a drawing. As liars’ memory of their 
answers is likely to be more unstable than that of a truth tellers (Vrij, 2015), there is likely to 
be more inconsistencies between their verbal output and that of their drawing (Fisher, Vrij, & 
Leins, 2013).  
There are theoretical justifications as to why unexpected questions are harder to 
answer for liars than expected questions. Sporer and Schwandt (2006) propose a Working 
Memory Model of deception which stems from Baddeley's (1983) Working Memory theory. 
Whilst a truth teller can answer unexpected and expected questions from the same episodic 
memory, a liar is unable to recite a practiced narrative in their answers to unexpected 
questions. They must therefore think of answers on the spot which places a strain on working 
memory. As such, their verbal responses are affected and are more likely to show cues to 
deceit, one of which is to include less detail in their answers. Truth tellers, however, are not 
affected by the additional load of an unexpected question. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that liars will be able to give more detail to expected questions than to unexpected questions; 
and this includes being able to give more detail than truth tellers to expected questions due to 
the element of rehearsal, and thus ease of access to the fabricated memory/answer. This 
supposition was supported by Lancaster et al. (2013) and  Shaw et al. (2013).  
In the current study, we aim to specifically study the utility of asking unanticipated 
‘process’ questions to magnify verbal credibility cues and compare their utility to those of 
‘outcome’ questions. Process and outcome questions are tailored around the developmental 
progression of a specific act. Process questions are more specific to the planning phase or the 
progressional experience of an event as opposed to the outcome of an event (Vrij, Mann, 
Leal, Vernham, & Vaughan, 2016). For example, ‘What is the purpose of your visit to 
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London?’, is an outcome question whilst ‘How did you plan your trip to London?’ is a 
process question. The use of process questions relating to the planning of an act stems from 
research which looked at planned intentions (Mac Giolla et al., 2013; Sooniste et al., 2013; 
Vrij et al., 2011). Truth tellers were more likely to refer to the planning stage of their 
intentions than liars. Truth tellers, who have experienced the progression of a true act, were 
able to draw on memory to answer questions regarding the processes involved in that act.  
The preparation for anticipated questions in relation to identity has relevance to 
significant security and terrorist operations. The Manchester Manual, a computerised file 
found by the Metropolitan Police in 2000 in the house of an al-Qaeda member, was a 179-
page document containing so-called training information for Jihadist fighters. It also 
contained information on the need for forged identity documents, such as passports and 
identity cards, the learning of the information on these forged documents, to avoid travel to 
the location of the country the forged passport was deemed to be issued by, counterfeit 
currency and changes to facial appearance. It also provided a list of questions, deemed as 
‘anticipated’, that an individual would need to be prepared to answer if being interrogated 
prior to, during and upon arrival at their travel destination. These questions predominantly 
related to the outcome of the travel and did not focus on planning or process questions. They 
included reasons for travel (outcome), the length of the travel period (outcome), who they 
would meet at the travel destination (outcome), what they would be doing at the travel 
destination (outcome) and who they would be staying with (outcome). One question – how 
one obtained the money for travel – could be deemed a process/planning question. The 
strategies shown here suggest that by manipulating the overriding expectation of outcome 
based questions being asked, verbal differences between identity truth tellers and liars may 
occur.  
Reality Monitoring  
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In the current study, participants are asked to lie or tell the truth about who they are, 
by answering questions related to past experiences. That is, we asked liars to create a series 
of false events that they have experienced. Lying about identity also involves lying about the 
past; essentially as identity is an accumulation of past events and liars are required to lie 
about the experiences they have endured. The current study aims to analyse the responses 
provided by the participants with Reality Monitoring (RM) by coding for spatial, temporal 
and perceptual information. RM is not a veracity detection tool, but a method of assessing the 
cognitive processes that are used when discriminating between external or perceptual sources 
and internal or imagined events (Johnson & Raye, 1981). The predominant aspect of RM is 
that the quality of details within actual perceived events and those which are imagined will 
vary (Vrij, 2008). RM stems from early methods of reality testing and memory monitoring. 
Reality testing generally refers to distinction between a present perception from a present act 
of remembering or imagination as described by Cameron and Carmichael (1963). It has links 
to clinical issues by looking as the real and the imagined in disorders such as schizophrenia 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981). Reality monitoring, however, looks at distinguishing a past 
perception or imagination from a present one. The underpinning of Johnson and Raye’s 
(1981) paper is that the act of experiencing an event is done so through a perceptual 
experience, and thus accounts of real events are more likely to be made up of details 
regarding: sensory perceptions; taste, smell, touch, visual and auditory information, 
contextual information; spatial information about the visual aspects of the experience (where 
it happened and where items and people were in relation to each other), temporal 
information; information about the order of events and their timings, and affective 
information; information regarding the individuals feelings during the event. The main 
difference between a real and imagined event is that an imagined event is more likely to 
consist of cognitive operations; explanatory thoughts and reasoning (“I found the phone in 
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my bag upon arriving home, so I must have picked it up from the table”) and as such concrete 
operations are often vague (Vrij, 2008). Research has supported the theoretical component to 
RM suggesting that reality and imagination-based memories are stored differently, with real 
memories including more sensory information (Gordon, Gerrig, & Franklin, 2009). 
Researchers have explored whether RM can be used as a lie detection method. The 
assumption behind this is that an imagined event represents the situation for liars. Research 
has tried to identify if there are RM attributes which can be used to discriminate between 
truths and lies, yet standardised criteria for use with RM has yet to be established (Vrij, 
2015). Particular support has, however, been found with relation to particular aspects of the 
RM approach, with a review of 30 laboratory studies (Vrij, 2008) suggesting that truth tellers 
provide more temporal, spatial and perceptual information than liars. An overview of the RM 
literature by Masip, Sporer, Garrido and Herrero (2005) showed that RM was able to 
discriminate between liars and truth tellers above that of chance level. RM has also been 
shown to be an effective addition to the cognitive interview (Logue, Book, Frosina, Huizinga, 
& Amos, 2015) and as a way of distinguishing between actual and imagined autobiographical 
events (Sporer & Sharman, 2006).  
Based on the existing literature, we hypothesised that truth tellers would provide more 
perceptual, spatial and temporal details their answers overall than liars (Hypothesis 1). We 
further hypothesised that truth tellers would provide more perceptual, spatial and temporal 
details in their answers to process questions than liars (Hypothesis 2).  
Exploratory Analysis: The Language of the Liar 
Briefly touching on a sociological approach, Mead (1967) proposed the individual we 
are is formed through language, communication and interaction with others. Truth tellers 
have a lifetime of experience in relation to their identity and the language used as part of that 
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process, whilst liars do not. It is hoped that these differences can be used to discriminate liars 
and truth tellers when investigating their language use regarding their identity.  
We focused on language use which has been shown to have diagnostic value when 
differentiating between liars and truth tellers in other deception scenarios. Truth tellers use 
more positive emotion words when describing autobiographical events, because such events 
tend to be positively biased (Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). The fading-affect bias 
(Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003) suggests that negative memories fade faster, 
reducing the number of negative emotions displayed within truthful discourse of such events. 
Negative emotion words have been associated with shame or guilt (Ekman,1988, 2009; Vrij, 
2008) and are thus more likely to be used by liars. When an individual is asked to respond to 
a question that is cognitively demanding, it is often reflected in the words they use. As lies 
are deemed cognitively more demanding than truth telling (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2017) 
we often see an increase in words associated with cognitive load in liars as opposed to truth 
tellers, including cognitive process words (e.g., cause, know, ought) and cause words (e.g., 
because, effect, hence) [DePaulo et al., 2003; Pennebaker & Chew, 1985; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006, 2007]). A meta-analysis from 44 studies in which software had been used to 
identity linguistic markers showed that liars experienced an increase in cognitive load, 
expressed more negative emotions and referred less to cognitive processes (Hauch, Blandón-
Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2015).  
However, these findings were obtained in a forensic domain; that is, during police-
suspect style interviews. In the current study, we did not ask individuals to lie about a 
transgression, but asked them to lie about a much larger aspect; who they are and experiences 
that contributed to who they are. Individuals who lie about their identity in an employment 
interview may adopt Impression Management (IM) tactics to convince an interviewer of their 
veracity (labelled persuasive deception by Dunbar et al., 2014). That is, they will manipulate 
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their language not only to convince the interviewer of their honesty, but also to convince the 
interviewer about their likeability and suitability for the role in question. This is achieved 
through interpersonal interaction and communication between the interviewer and the 
interviewee. Research has shown that almost all interviewees overemphasise their positive 
attributes and de-emphasise negative ones (e.g., Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Jansen, 
König, Stadelmann, & Kleinmann, 2012). In addition, deceptive individuals have been shown 
to strategically mask any associated feelings of shame or guilt with the use of positive 
language (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Research by Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker and Twitchell 
(2004) used LIWC to analyse verbal differences between truth tellers and liars. Whilst they 
found no multivariate effect of affect, follow up analyses showed that liars used more 
positive affect than truth tellers. Research conducted by Burgoon et al., (2015) showed that 
when conference calls were analysed, unscripted answers were higher in positive emotion 
words than when the answers were scripted. Therefore, the answers which were prepared in 
advance, contained fewer positive emotion words than unprepared answers. In addition, using 
a corpus of thirty-two native American English speakers, LIWC indicated that of the possible 
68 categories examined, positive emotions words were the most indicative of deception 
(Hirschberg et al., 2005; cf. Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003). 
Due to the current study’s paradigm of a recruitment style interview, we expect to see 
liars to use language to their advantage and presenting themselves more positively than truth 
tellers, by using more positive emotion words (e.g., love, sweet, nice) (Hypothesis 3). We 
also expect to see less negative language used by liars than truth tellers (e.g., hurt, ugly, 
nasty) in an attempt to distance themselves from their deception (Hypothesis 4). In addition, 
we expect that differences will be amplified by the use of process questions. We predict that 
liars will manage their impressions by decreasing negative words for questions which are 
unexpected, so that they are used less often than by truth tellers, to compensate for the 
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increasing difficulty in answering the question (Hypothesis 5). We also expect liars to use 
more positive words than truth tellers for process questions (Hypothesis 6), again in an 
attempt to manage the impressions they exhibit during questioning. 
In the current study, we also wish to explore how asking unanticipated process 
questions affects the use of cognitive process words and cause words. Whilst leading 
theoretical underpinnings of deceptive behaviour are often explained in terms of cognitive 
load (Vrij, Fisher et al., 2008), such findings are specific to police-suspect scenarios. That is, 
during previous police-suspect scenario interviews, it is the individual’s involvement in a 
transgression that is under question. In the current study, we ask liars not to deny their 
involvement in a crime, but to lie about who they are. Whilst we suspect that there will be a 
difference between liars and truth tellers in their use of cognitive process and cause words, 
there is not enough existing literature to be able to draw a clear prediction in which direction 
such a difference will be observed; that is, the level of cognitive load experienced by identity 
deceivers is unexplored within deception literature. We therefore expect to see a difference 
between truth tellers and liars in terms of cognitive process words (Hypothesis 7) yet remain 
non-directional in such a prediction. The same is also true for cause words. Whilst we expect 
to see a difference between truth teller and liars in terms of cause words (Hypothesis 8), we 
are not able to predict if this will be higher for liars or truth tellers. If a difference is observed, 
we will use exploratory analysis to see how such differences occur between process and 
outcome questions and if such differences appear from a main effect of Veracity or Question 
Type (process versus Outcome).  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 60 participants, comprising of 23 males and 37 females, aged between 18 
and 68 years (M = 25.10. SD = 10.22) with a median age of 21 years were recruited from the 
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University of Portsmouth’s student (n = 52) and staff (n = 8) population. No participants were 
excluded from the study, and thus all data was included.  
Design 
The current study used a mixed design with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the between-
subjects factor and the Question Type (outcome versus process) as the within-subjects factor. 
Total detail, perceptual detail, temporal detail, spatial detail, positive emotion words, 
negative emotion words, cognitive process words and cause words were the dependent 
variables. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via internal advertising university webpages and online 
participant pool. Participants were informed that the study would consist of a recruitment 
style interview for a fictitious job position, and that they would attend either truthfully as 
themselves or assuming the identity of somebody else. Seven days before the study was due 
to take place, participants were emailed further information about the experiment, including 
their veracity status. In addition, both truth tellers and liars were given the choice of the type 
of position they would be applying for from the following options: (a) Journalism, (b) 
Politics, (c) Music, (d) Film/Media, (e) Lecturer/Academic, (f) Veterinary/Animal 
Management, (g) Researcher, (h) Psychologist, (i) Medical professional and (j) 
Business/Executive. Both truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 30) were told to think about the 
type of questions that may be asked during the interview and to prepare for them. However, 
liars were told that they must take part in the interview assuming the identity of somebody 
else and must not reveal their true identity to the interviewer. They were told that they were 
to be taking part in an undercover mission to gain access to the target organisation. They 
were required to obtain a position to allow them to spy on internal members of staff who are 
thought to be members of an extremist organisation and that their mission was to remain 
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undercover. It was stressed that their answers to questions should be entirely fictitious. Truth 
tellers were told to be entirely truthful throughout the interview. To encourage participants to 
perform well, participants were told that those providing a convincing interview would be 
entered into a prize draw to win one of two £100 prizes.  
Seven days later participants arrived at the laboratory at pre-arranged times and were 
asked to read over the participant information sheet and to sign the informed consent form. 
Participants were asked if they required any preparation time. Once the participant was ready, 
they were asked to complete a pre-interview questionnaire to obtain demographic 
information. They were also asked how motivated they were to perform well during the 
interview on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from [1] Extremely Unmotivated to [7] Extremely 
Motivated. After completion of the pre-interview questionnaire, participants were taken to be 
interviewed, by one of three female research assistants who were blind to the veracity status 
of each participant, and also to our hypotheses. Each participant, irrespective of veracity and 
type of position, was asked the same standardised set of questions, which included eight 
thematically related questions, split into an outcome and a process question. Therefore, a total 
of 16 questions were asked as part of the interview (see appendix A). The order of the 
questions remained consistent throughout. The interview was audio recorded and later 
transcribed.  
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire to obtain 
information regarding the level of truthfulness during their overall interview and the level of 
truthfulness to each outcome and process questions. Participants were asked to rate their 
truthfulness on a series of 11-point Likert scales (ranging from [0] a complete lie to [10] 
completely truthful). After the questionnaire was completed the participants were thanked 
and debriefed.  
Coding 
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RM coding. 
The interviews were transcribed and the responses were coded by a rater, blind to the 
veracity status of the participant. Based upon Vrij et al. (2016), perceptual information, 
temporal information and spatial information were each numerically coded and a total detail 
calculated for each participant in terms of the interview overall, and broken down into the 
answers to process and outcome questions. Participants answered questions pertaining to the 
present or future by drawing upon memories from the past. We therefore coded all responses 
for perceptual, spatial and temporal details.  
Perceptual information relates to details that pertain to the experiences from sensory 
inputs such as sound (e.g., ‘I heard my line manager knock on my door’), smell (e.g., ‘I could 
smell burning from the photocopier), taste (e.g., ‘I could taste lemon dish soap in my office 
mug), touch (e.g., ‘The computer hard drive was very hot to the touch’) and vision (e.g., ‘I 
saw the job in animal management’). Spatial information relates to location information (e.g., 
‘I was sitting at my desk in my office’) or the arrangements of objects (e.g., ‘My desk was 
situated next to the boardroom’) or people (e.g., ‘My boss was stood behind me at the time’). 
Temporal information relates to information pertaining to the time an event occurred (e.g., ‘I 
was in my second year at University’) or to describe a sequence of events (e.g., ‘After my 
final exam I went straight to the careers advisor’). 
Inter-rater reliability. 
A second coder, also blind to the veracity status of the interviews, coded 12 of the 60 
interviews (20%). The inter-rater reliability scores were high: total detail, ICC = .938, 
perceptual information, ICC = .919, temporal information, ICC = .968 and spatial 
information, ICC = .861. 
Use of language. 
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Each interview was separated into a single text document, with the questions and any 
utterances made by the interviewer removed. These files were then analysed by the 
computerised text analysis software LIWC (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015) 
to provide nominal counts for positive emotion words of which there are 406 words 
categorised (e.g., love, nice, sweet), negative emotion words of which there are 499 words 
categorised (e.g., hurt, ugly, nasty) cognitive process words of which there are 730 words 
(e.g., cause, ought, know) and cause words, which are a subcategory of cognitive process 
words and includes 108 categorised words (e.g., because, effect, hence). The process was 
then repeated but each interview was separated into two separate text documents, with the 
answers to outcome questions in one file and the answers to process questions in another. 
Again, each file was analysed with LIWC and nominal counts for positive emotion words, 
negative emotion words, cognitive process words and cause words. 
Results 
Questionnaire Responses 
Motivation.  
The motivation of the participants to be convincing in the recruitment interview was 
high (M = 5.83 out of 7, SD = .92, 95% CI [.67, 1.17]). There was no difference between 
truth tellers (M = 5.70, SD = 1.09, 95% CI [.67, 1.46) and liars (M = 5.97, SD = .72, 95% CI 
[.49, .90]) in motivation scores, t(58) = 1.21, p = .268, d = .29. 
Manipulation check.  
Truth tellers reported an overall truthfulness rating as high (M = 9.43 out of 10, SD = 
.68, 95% CI [.49, .80]), whilst liars reported an overall truthfulness rating as low (M = 2.07 
out of 10, SD = 2.66, 95% CI [1.17, 3.00]). This difference was significant, t(58) = 14.68, p < 
0.001, d = 3.79. Truth tellers reported their overall truthfulness rating for outcome questions 
as high (M = 9.26 out of 10, SD = .89, 95% CI [.54, 1.09]), whilst liars reported their overall 
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truthfulness rating for outcome questions as low (M = 1.89 out of 10, SD = 2.32, 95% CI 
[1.06, 3.20]). Also this difference was significant, t(58) = 16.24, p < 0.001, d = 4.19. Finally, 
truth tellers reported their overall truthfulness rating for process questions as high (M = 8.85 
out of 10, SD = 2.03, 95% CI [.76, 3.18]), whilst liars reported their overall truthfulness 
rating for process questions as low (M = 1.23 out of 10, SD = 2.03, 95% CI [.89, 3.21]). This 
difference was significant, t(58) = 14.28, p < 0.001, d = 3.75. These findings support the 
validity of the veracity manipulation. 
Interview Responses 
Duration.  
There was no significant difference between duration of the interviews in seconds 
between truth tellers (M = 951.40, SD = 582.00, 95% CI [282.93, 825.19]) and liars (M = 
887.33, SD = 424.60, 95% CI [226.38, 612.70]), t(58) = .487, p = .628, d = .13. 
Word count.  
There was no significant difference for word count between truth tellers (M = 
1629.20, SD = 1049.82, 95% CI [625.64, 1363.22]) and liars (M = 1604.10, SD = 1035.60, 
95% CI [428.77, 1533.52]), t(58) = .093, p = .926, d = .02.  
A one-factor between subjects MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus 
lie) as the only factor, and, total process question word count and total outcome question 
word count as the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed no significant multivariate 
main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .957, F(2, 57) = .733, p = .485, ηp2 = .025. In addition, 
no significant univariate main effects were obtained for any of the two dependent variables, 
all F’s < .94, all p’s > .761 (see Table 1). 
RM Detail 
A 2 x 2 mixed-design MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as 
the between-subjects factor, Question Type (process versus outcome) as the within-subjects 
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factor, and (i) perceptual detail, (ii) spatial detail and, (ii) temporal detail as the dependent 
variables. The MANOVA revealed no significant main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .899, 
F(3, 54) = 2.012, p = .123, ηp2 = .101 (see Table 2). Hypothesis 1 is therefore not supported. 
The MANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Question Type Wilks’ λ = .771, F(3, 
54) = 5.348, p =.003, ηp2 = .229. A significant univariate effect was obtained for one of the 
three dependent variables. Answers to process questions contained significantly more 
perceptual detail than for outcome questions (see Table 3). There was no Veracity X 
Question Type interaction, λ = .974, F(3, 54) = .477, p = .700, ηp2 = .026. Hypothesis 2 is 
therefore not supported.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Exploratory Analysis  
Use of Language 
  
A 2 x 2 mixed-design MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as 
the between-subjects factor, Question Type (process versus outcome) as the within-subjects 
factor, and (i) positive emotion words, (ii) negative emotion words, (iii) cognitive process 
words, and (vi) cause words as the dependent variables.  The MANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .806, F(4, 55) = 3.307, p = .017, ηp2 = .101. 
Significant univariate effects for Veracity were obtained for two of the four dependent 
variables. Liars used significantly more positive emotion words than truth tellers. In addition, 
truth tellers used significantly more cognitive process words than liars (see Table 4). 
Hypothesis 3 and 7 are therefore supported, whilst there is no support for Hypothesis 4 and 8. 
The MANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Question Type Wilks’ λ = .554, F(4, 
55) = 11.079, p < .001, ηp2 = .446. Significant univariate effects for Question Type were 
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obtained for all of the dependent variables. Positive emotion words were used significantly 
more in response to outcome questions than to process questions. Negative emotion words 
were also used significantly more in response to outcome questions than to process questions. 
Cognitive process words occurred significantly more in response to process questions and 
cause words appeared significantly more in response to process questions than to outcome 
questions (see Table 5). There was no Veracity X Question Type interaction, λ = .864, F(4, 
55) = .2.171, p = .084, ηp2 = .136. Hypothesis 5 and 6 are therefore not supported.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Power 
A power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) and using 
MANOVA for repeated measures with within-between interactions, indicates that for a large 
effect size f(V) = 0.8, α = 0.05, with two groups, a sample size of 28 (14 per cell) would be 
sufficient for a power of 0.95, when measuring three response variables. Three response 
variables pertain to the RM MANOVA calculations. For the LIWC MANOVA analyses, with 
the same power and alpha thresholds, four response variables would require a total sample 
size of 32 (16 per cell). However, there is a wide range effect sizes within the deception 
literature. For example, based upon the median effect of .10 for deceptive cues as per the 
seminal paper by DePaulo et al., (2003), to obtain a sufficient power of 0.8, with α = 0.05, 
two groups and three response variables, the total sample size would need to be 1548 (774 
per cell), or 1721 (860 per cell) for four response variables. However, DePaulo et al., (2003) 
was predominantly based upon non-verbal cues to deception, whilst the current paper 
investigated verbal cues. In comparison, verbal veracity studies using unexpected questions 
have shown larger effect sizes (i.e., .79, [Vrij et al., 2018]). These overall power calculations 
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were made after the study was conducted. Of course, such large sample sizes have not been 
used in deception experiments to date and would actually make running studies unfeasible. 
Discussion 
Reality Monitoring 
In the current study, we predicted that the answers to process questions would elicit 
more cues to deceit amongst liars than outcome questions in terms of RM detail. We found 
no difference in the detail given by truth tellers and liars in their answers to process and 
outcome questions, nor in their answers overall. Although these findings are not supported by 
existing literature, we suggest a number of reasons as to why this may be in the current 
domain of identity deception detection. First, memories for events fade over time (Murre & 
Dros, 2015), and therefore so will specific details associated with these memories. Vrij 
(2015) states that RM is not a suitable tool for distant memories. In addition, Sporer and 
Sharman (2006) demonstrated that recent memories were richer in RM details than distant 
memories. Whilst we do not assume that all previous employment and personal experiences 
would have been recalled from distant memories, it is a possible explanation as to why RM 
was not able to distinguish between truth tellers and liars. Had these actual memories for 
events (for truth tellers) been from a significantly earlier time, experiential details often 
identified within RM may have been forgotten, narrowing the differences between truth 
tellers and liars.  
A second reason as to why RM may not have differentiated between truth tellers and 
liars in the current study is preparation time. It may be that liars spent more time preparing 
for the identity interview than truth tellers. This of course makes sense as truth tellers were 
relying on their memory as opposed to their story telling abilities. This may mean that the 
fabricated memories of liars were quicker to access than the actual memories for truth tellers 
who needed to search through their internal repertoire of memories to be able to answer. If 
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liars spent longer than truth tellers preparing for the interview, this may have been a 
contributor to liars’ ability to provide numerous details. We know that liars are strategic in 
preparing to be interviewed in police-suspect style interviews (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 
Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010), yet we are not fully aware of the strategies of individuals 
who lie about their identity. Whilst it is envisaged that such strategies are likely to be 
somewhat similar (i.e., rehearsing answers to anticipated questions, [Granhag, Andersson, 
Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007)]), further research into 
strategies is needed.  
In addition, when a liar is aware that a detailed account is more likely to be believed, 
the discriminate ability of RM is reduced (McDougall & Bull, 2015; Nahari & Pazuelo, 
2015). In lieu of their honesty, liars may have strategically included more details in their 
accounts. The inclusion of details in a known strategy employed by liars to appear more 
credible during an interview (Bell & Loftus, 1989) and may have motivated them to provide 
detailed accounts. Studies have shown that statements higher in detail are more likely to be 
deemed as credible (Adams & Jarvis, 2006; Bell & Loftus, 1988). If a liar adopts the strategy 
of providing a statement rich in detail, the diagnostic utility of RM is reduced. 
Finally, interviewees lied about their identity rather than a transgression; the typical 
domain in which RM deception research has been carried out. The individual who lies about 
his/her identity is not lying in the same way as a transgression suspect. A suspect lying about 
a transgression may only have a short window of time for which they need to be deceptive 
(e.g. the time of the transgression), whereas an identity deceiver has an exhaustive window; 
an entire lifetime. This may have allowed the liars to adopt strategies such as embedding lies 
into their own true narratives (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013) and an affluence of details may 
have been generated by adopting a ‘story telling approach’ (Jupe et al., 2016). Individuals 
may also describe the identity of a close friend or relative, which allows a strategy close to 
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embedding and includes experiences that are obtained by somebody else. Although unique 
sensory details may be more often seen in spontaneous accounts in relation to a transgression 
(Adams & Jarvis, 2006), liars may have found it easy to include a wide array of details from 
previous experiences, as a means of sensory embedding, therefore reducing the differences 
between truth tellers and liars. Research has shown that when liars report previous 
experiences, as opposed to outright fabrications, the ability of RM to distinguish between 
liars and truth tellers was reduced (Gnisci, Caso, & Vrij, 2010). It seems logical that liars 
would adopt such a strategy.  
The Language of the Liar 
In the current study, we predicted that when answering process questions, liars would 
show differences in the type of language they use when compared with truth tellers. We did 
not find evidence for this. However, in line with our predictions, liars used more positive 
language in their interviews overall than truth tellers. Self-presentation Impression 
Management (IM) theories may help to explain such findings. The self-presentation model of 
deception (DePaulo et al., 2003) postulates that to appear credible, individuals groom their 
presentation to others; that is, they filter what the recipient does and does not see. By filtering 
negativity (in terms of negative affect) and increasing positivity (positive affect), the overall 
assessment of the individual is likely to be more favourable. Pro-social behaviour has been 
suggested as way to dissipate feelings of guilt (Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Staub, 
1978). The use of positive language in the current study may have acted as positive self-
feedback; a way of intrapersonally distancing oneself from the act of deception by speaking 
more positively about oneself. In addition, in line with the findings of Donovan et al. (2003) 
and Jansen et al. (2012), lying interviewees in the current study may have manipulated their 
use of positive language as a way of emphasiing their likability, reducing the liklihood of 
their deception being identified. Interpsersonal Deception Theory (IDT) posits that 
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individuals who are able to better communicate with positive affect, are more likely to be 
deemed as credible (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
We specifically wanted to see if process questions could maginify the differences 
between truth tellers and liars. We did not find differences between the type of language used 
by liars and truth tellers when they were asked either process or outcomes questions 
(interaction effect). However, we did find that Question Type had an overall effect on the 
language used by particpants. Process questions contained less affect (positive and negative) 
than outcomes questions. This makes logical sense. When an individual has to think harder to 
answer a question, thus increasing congitive load, they may be less inclined to discuss 
elements of emotions such as feelings or personal states whilst they try and generate plausible 
answers.   
We also wanted to explore the use of cognitive process and cause words by liars and 
truth tellers. We predicted that there would be a difference, but due to the scant literature on 
cognitive load in identity deception interviews, this prediction remained non-directional. We 
found that truth tellers used more cognitive process words than liars in their overall answers. 
There was, however, no difference in cause words. This finding is interesting in relation to 
the current relationship between deception and cognitive load (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; 
Vrij, 2015). In the current paradigm, individuals were asked questions not only about their 
past, but also the processes involved. The findings would suggest that truth tellers, whilst 
attempting to stick as close to the truth as possible, searched through memory for genuine 
answers to genuine problems. For example, when answering the questions ‘What was the 
most ‘difficult’ social aspect of your most recent job or recent education?’ and ‘How did this 
situation evolve into being and how exactly did this incident affect your relationship with 
your co-workers / fellow students?’, truth tellers may have worked hard to search for the 
exact memory of the event and the process involved, therefore using more cognitive process 
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and cause words in their verbal outputs. Having to search through memory is an indication of 
cognitive load. Liars, on the other hand, may have recited the most logical story telling 
narrative which answers the question. This does not include searching through episodic 
memory to find an answer. It includes generating an answer which makes the most logical 
sense in response to the question. It may also have links with the notion of inhibition. Truth 
tellers may have worked harder to supress extreme negative events that they did not wish to 
discuss in the interview (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, & Yoo, 2014). Liars do not have to do 
this if they adopt a story telling approach.  
Whilst it has not been associated with deception detection literature previously, Zipf’s 
Principle of Least Effort (PLE, Zipf, 2016) may allow for a possible explanation as to why 
truth tellers exhibited higher signs of cognitive load than liars. According to the PLE, human 
behaviour can be explained by efficiency law, in that people seek actions with the least effort 
but with maximum gain. In essence, people operate upon a cost-benefit analysis. If we apply 
the PLE to the current identity domain, due to the prevalence of deception in everyday 
discourse (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), the PLE would posit that it 
is in fact easier for liars, who are not hampered by memory limitations, to create a convincing 
story; and to tell a story ‘on the fly’. Truth tellers however, will need to search through their 
memories to find the best, yet truthful, answer. This implies that truth tellers may face higher 
levels of cognitive load than liars within the current domain. This, however does not support 
the supposition by Burgoon (2015) on the notion of differing cognitive load depending on the 
discourse genre. Burgoon states that when lying about factual narratives, liars are faced with 
the task of monitoring which details to tell and making sure that they are plausible and 
coherent, whilst truth tellers are only restricted by memory. Liars may be affected by other 
elements of speech that were not examined in the current study, such as providing answers 
which are deemed plausible. However, it is widely accepted amongst the deception literature 
UNEXPECTED PROCESS QUESTIONS IN IDENTITY DECEPTION 27 
that events which are more recent, are easier for truth tellers to recall than those which are 
distant memories (Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & Tcholakian, 2013; Vrij, 2014; Burgoon 2015). 
When applied to the current study, truth tellers may have found it harder to retrieve actual 
memories than for liars who have recently rehearsed their own narrative.  In most situations, 
liars have to multi-task; that is, they need to pay close attention to what they are saying 
verbally whilst also monitoring their impression management.  In addition, they must make 
choices about which aspects of questions to lie about and which to not. Such dual monitoring 
or multi-tasking is places more strain on cognitive load (Vrij, 2015). The juxtaposition of 
findings suggests that there is an avenue for future research which further explores the 
cognitive load experienced by liars and truth tellers when discussing their identity. 
In line with a supposition that liars need to dual monitor their responses, future 
research which asks a combined set of outcome questions first and then their associated 
process questions after, in a random presentation, may increase the cognitive load imposed on 
liars. This is in line with the suggestion that asking unanticipated questions before returning 
to standard questions, is more likely to elicit revealing information (Burgoon et al., 1994). 
This may in turn further exasperate the findings from the current study. Liars will have to try 
and remember their answers to many outcome questions and then simultaneously provide a 
plausible response to the process questions. It is envisaged that this will be a difficult task.  
Limitations with regards to applying IM theory to the current research may include 
that of possible demand characteristics. Although research has demonstrated that 
transgression related lies told within the laboratory show a similar detectability rate with that 
of lies told in real-life forensic settings (Hartwig & Bond, 2014), the domain of identity 
deception research is in its infancy. We must therefore tread cautiously. The interview within 
the laboratory is a social situation itself (Page, 1981), and without further research which 
includes strategy data, we cannot rule out that findings from the current study are in part 
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related to participants preconceived ideas about the study. In addition, the findings of 
Burgoon and Qin (2006) suggest that there can be significant variability in the ways that 
individuals use verbal behaviour when lying and telling the truth across a variety of verbal 
measures. Such findings not only push towards an individual differences approach but may 
also lend support towards linguistic variations across interview contexts. Therefore, exploring 
linguistic variables in relation to identity, across a variety of interviewing and contextual 
methods is a potential avenue for future research.  
In the current study, the liars’ mission was to use a false identity to obtain a position 
of employment to allow them to spy on internal members of staff who are thought to be 
members of an extremist organisation. Essentially, this is a positive mission. Although those 
in the deceptive condition were lying, one could argue that they did so for a good cause. As 
their mission was to avoid rejection as a potential candidate to allow undercover operations, 
lying in the current context may not have created the same emotional response that is usually 
expected of liars (Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman, Depaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). This lack of anxiety 
may have allowed for more detailed and positive accounts. Future studies should therefore 
take this into account.  
It is also worth noting that the current study is likely to be underpowered, and as such 
may have contributed to the current findings. We discussed such power calculations in the 
results sections. There are issues in relation to low power which should be considered when 
interpreting the findings from the current paper. Studies with low power relating from low 
sample sizes can result in both an over inflation of significant effects and a failure to detect 
small effects (Yarkoni, 2009). Whilst this is something to be considerate of, running highly 
powered studies is particularly difficult in social science research where those who 
participate often do so on a voluntary basis. However, as identity deception is a newly 
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emerging field, we would expect findings from the current study to be replicated in future 
research, and that such power considerations can be taken into account.  
In addition, we must take into account the paradigm in which these findings were 
obtained:  A recruitment style interview. We asked truth tellers to be entirely honest in their 
interviews which was supported with manipulation checks. However, research has shown that 
individuals frequently lie in job applications (Reinhard et al., 2013; Weiss & Feldman, 2006). 
This may indicate that participants in the truthful condition of the current study may not have 
been acting in a way that maps real world behaviour. Future studies may want to take into 
account the specific instructions given to truth tellers to yield more representative behaviour. 
It is also possible that liars used embedded lies in the current study (Leins et al., 2013), as per 
partial explanation to the RM findings. Future research should consider incorporate asking 
participants about their verbal strategies to identify if embedding is commonplace in identity 
deception.  
In conclusion, the findings from the RM analysis are inconsistent with previous 
findings. This suggests that RM may not have diagnostic value when applied to the cross-
situational domain of identity deception. The findings from linguistic analysis showed that 
there are significant differences in the way that truth tellers and liars manage their overall 
verbal outputs with regards to positive emotion language and cognitive process words. We 
also found that process questions appeared to elicit more cognitive process and cause words 
than outcome questions, suggesting that process questions are harder to answer than outcome 
questions.  
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Table 1 
MANOVA results for each of the outcome question and process question word count dependent variables.  
 Truth (n = 30) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (n = 30) 
Mean (SD) 
F df p ηp2  
 
d 
Total outcome question word 
count 
762.87 (496.61) 725.37 (452.11) .094 1,58 .761 .002 .08 
Total process question word 
count 
866.33 (571.31) 878.70 (591.11) .007 1,58 .935 .000 .02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
UNEXPECTED PROCESS QUESTIONS IN IDENTITY DECEPTION 43 
MANOVA results for each of the RM dependent variables.  
 Truth (n = 30) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (n = 30) 
Mean (SD) 
F df p ηp2  
 
d 
Perceptual details 425.50 (287.60) 388.63 (178.32) .356 1,58 .553 .006 .15 
Temporal details 48.70 (30.06) 43.60 (33.20) .384 1,58 .538 .007 .16 
Spatial details 22.33 (18.27) 28.13 (21.25) 1.285 1,58 .262 .022 .29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
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MANOVA results for each of the RM dependent variables as a function of Question Type 
 Process 
Mean (SD) 
Outcome 
Mean (SD) 
F  df p ηp2  
 
d 
Perceptual details  209.96 (110.63) 188.81 (117.11) 8.924 1,56 .004 .137 .18 
Temporal details  23.03 (15.57) 23.75 (17.14) .485 1,56 .489 .009 .04 
Spatial details  12.81 (10.22) 13.21 (10.64) .190 1,56 .665 .003 .03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
MANOVA results for each of the language dependent variables. 
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 Truth (n = 30) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (n = 30) 
Mean (SD) 
F  df p ηp2  
 
d 
Total positive emotion words 3.08 (.75) 3.49 (.81) 4.15 1,58 .046* .067 .53 
Total negative emotion 
words 
1.36 (.59) 1.37 (.63) .041 1,58 .841 .001 .01 
Total cognitive process 
words  
16.58 (2.40) 15.40 (1.95) 4.38 1,58 .043* .069 .54 
Total cause words 2.22 (.65) 1.87 (.66) 4.02 1,58 .063 .059 .53 
*p < .05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
MANOVA results for each of the language dependent variables as a function of Question Type 
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 Process  
Mean (SD) 
Outcome 
Mean (SD) 
F  df p ηp2  
 
d 
Positive emotion words  3.14 (.93) 3.43 (1.00) 4.178 1,58 .046* .067 .30 
Negative emotion words  1.29 (.70) 1.45 (.63) 4.783 1,58 .033* .076 .24 
Cognitive process words  16.36 (2.50) 15.55 (2.49) 9.579 1,58 .003** .142 .32 
Cause words  2.31 (.86) 1.71 (.71) 33.554 1,58 <.001*** .366 .76 
*p < .05; **p < .005; ***p < .001
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Appendix A 
 
1a) What is it about this role that interests you? 
 
1b) What potential issues or stumbling blocks did you think you may face as part of this 
interview and what considerations have you made about how you would overcome these? 
 
2a) Can you describe for me an incident during your education or previous employment 
where you let yourself down?  
 
2b) How did this incident affect your relationship at the time with your boss/ fellow students / 
supervisor/ and/or co-workers? 
 
3a) What relevant background knowledge and/or experience do you have for this job? 
 
3b) How did you come to acquire this knowledge/ experience?  
 
4a) What was your greatest weakness in your previous job or most recent education? 
 
4b) How did you manage to compensate for this weakness? What strategies did you use 
overcome this? 
  
5a) What was your greatest strength in your previous job or most recent education? 
 
5b) Was there a particular experience, which demonstrated this strength, and how did you use 
it to achieve a goal or solution? 
 
6a) What was the most ‘difficult’ social aspect of your most recent job or recent education?  
 
6b) How did this situation evolve into being and how exactly did this incident affect your 
relationship with your co-workers / fellow students?  
 
7a) What was your last disagreement at work or university concerning?  
 
7b) How did you practically overcome the friction caused (i.e. resolve the issue)? 
 
8a) Where do you aspire to be/ see yourself in 2 years’ time? 
 
8b) How have 2-3 notable events, over the last few years, influenced these career aspirations? 
 
 
 
